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STRENGTHENING OUR SECURITY: A NEW INTERNATIONAL STANDARD
ON TRADE-BASED MONEY LAUNDERING IS NEEDED NOW
Ross S. Delston & Stephen C. Walls
Recently, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) missed an
opportunity to address trade-based money laundering (TBML) in its
International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the
Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, known as the Forty
Recommendations. In mid-February 2012, the FATF incorporated the Nine
Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing into its Forty
Recommendations, yet chose not to revise the Forty Recommendations to
specifically address TBML. Despite the serious and growing concern within
the AML/CFT field and FATF over the widespread abuse of the
international trade system to legitimize the proceeds of crime and finance
terrorist activities, and the demonstrated ability of FATF to identify and
respond to evolving money laundering typologies, TBML remains the only
major avenue of money laundering that the FATF Forty Recommendations
have not explicitly addressed. Because of the need for international action
on TBML that reaches beyond banks, this article therefore proposes
language for a new 41st Recommendation.
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I. BACKGROUND
A.

TBML Is Widely Regarded as a Global Threat

Estimates for the amount of money laundering through the abuse of
the international trade system range from $5 billion for Colombia alone1 to
“hundreds of billions” worldwide.2 Trade-based money laundering (TBML)
has been identified as a major issue in the popular press for almost twenty
years,3 and has received significant attention in both the U.S. Congress and
the Executive Branch since at least the late 1990s.4 The Financial Action
Task Force (FATF) first took note of TBML as a major avenue of money
laundering in 2006 in its Report entitled Trade Based Money Laundering.5
1
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE ET AL., 2007 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY 7 app. at
57 (2007) (noting the money laundering in connection with drug trafficking in Colombia);
see also Oriana Zill & Lowell Bergman, The Black Peso Money Laundering System,
FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/blackpeso.html
(last visited Mar. 29, 2012) (citing Fanny Kertzman, former Director of Colombian Customs).
2
BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 5 (2009).
3
See Oriana Zill & Lowell Bergman, U.S. Business & Money Laundering, FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/us.html (last visited Mar. 29,
2012).
4
See The Black Market Peso Exchange – How U.S. Companies Are Used to Launder
Money: Hearing Before the S. Caucus on Int’l Narcotics Control, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Black Market Peso Exchange Hearing] (statement of Bonni Tischler, Assistant
Comm’r, U.S. Customs Service.).
5
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF], TRADE BASED MONEY LAUNDERING 1 (2006),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/25/37038272.pdf [hereinafter FATF TBML
REPORT].
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TBML not only threatens legitimate businesses in both the
developed and developing world by undermining legal import and export
operations,6 it also impacts one of the largest sources of income for many
developing countries—customs duties.7 Beyond the threats to legitimate
businesses, economic development and the rule of law, the U.S. State
Department and U.S. Treasury Department have directly linked TBML
schemes with Hezbollah,8 the Afghanistan drug trade,9 and al-Qaeda.10
Despite recognition of the widespread abuse of the international
trade system to legitimize the proceeds of crime and finance terrorist
activities, and the demonstrated ability of FATF to respond to evolving
money laundering typologies,11 TBML remains the only one of three main
avenues of money laundering12 that has not been addressed by specific
language in the FATF Forty Recommendations.
B.

Legally Binding U.N. Conventions on International Crime and
Corruption Require Action on TBML

A December 2009 report from the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC), which analyzed the requirements of international instruments
6
See Shannon K. O’Neil, Trade-Based Money Laundering in Mexico, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL., LATIN AMERICA’S MOMENT BLOG (Apr. 13, 2011), http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/
2011/04/13/trade-based-money-laundering-in-mexico/; see also Tod Robberson Traffickers
Use U.S. Businesses, Cash Smuggling to Hide Billions in Profit, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 19,
2010),
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20011119&slug=drug
trade19.
7
See, e.g., BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, 2 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 88 (2007) (stating that
customs duties comprise “40–50 percent of annual Bangladesh government income.”).
8
Drug Investigations Lead to Treasury 311 Patriot Act Designation Against Lebanese
Bank Tied to Hizballah, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.
justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr021011.html.
9
BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 5 (2008) (“[T]here is increasing
realization that . . . trade goods in Dubai and elsewhere are being purchased with Afghan
drug proceeds. . . .”).
10
BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 17 (2004) [hereinafter 2004
INCSR]; e.g., John S. Zdanowicz, Trade Based Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing,
5 REV. L. & ECON. 855, 867 (2009) (charting the abnormally high import prices from alQaeda watch list countries and the abnormally low export prices from al-Qaeda watch list
countries).
11
See FATF, NINE SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING 2–3 (2001)
[hereinafter NINE SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media
/fatf/documents/reports/9%20Special%20Recommendations.pdf.
12
See FATF TBML REPORT, supra note 5; see also FATF, BEST PRACTICES PAPER ON
TRADE BASED MONEY LAUNDERING 1 (2008) [hereinafter FATF TBML BEST PRACTICES],
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/9/28/40936081.pdf.
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addressing money laundering, found that, although neither relevant U.N.
conventions nor the Forty Recommendations contain an “express
obligation” to address TBML, TBML does fit under the broad obligations to
combat money laundering contained in those conventions.13 The report
states “to properly investigate money-laundering . . . the money-laundering
offence needs to be defined broadly to include trade-based moneylaundering schemes” and goes on to say that:
[T]he Organized Crime Convention, the Convention Against Corruption
and the FATF recommendations require countries to identify, investigate
and prosecute trade-based money laundering schemes, through both the
monitoring of financial transactions and sharing of relevant trade data,
[although] the provisions of the two conventions and the FATF recommendations are rather general and give Member States little guidance on
how best to implement their obligations. 14

C.

FATF Missed Opportunities to Address TBML in 1996, 2003 and
2012

In February 2012, the FATF passed on its third major opportunity
to address TBML in its Forty Recommendations.15 At that time, the FATF
incorporated the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing16
into the Forty Recommendations,17 yet chose not to revise the Forty
Recommendations to include a new international standard on combating
TBML.
Although TBML is implicitly captured by the broad range of antimoney laundering (AML) requirements in the relevant U.N. conventions,18
the FATF has not provided explicit TBML requirements for its members.
Even though the FATF drafted the original Forty Recommendations in
1996, revised them in 2003, and again in 2012, and has addressed specific
typologies and threats in those revisions,19 AML/CFT obligations regarding
13

U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, International Cooperation to Address MoneyLaundering Based on Relevant United Nations and Other Instruments, Working Paper by the
Secretariat, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.213/8 (Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter U.N. AML Report].
14
Id. at ¶ 36 (emphasis added).
15
See FATF Steps up the Fight Against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing,
FATF (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatf
stepsupthefightagainstmoneylaunderingandterroristfinancing.html (describing the actions
taken at the Paris meeting).
16
See id.; NINE SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11.
17
See generally FATF, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING
AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS
(2012) [hereinafter FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS].
18
U.N. AML Report, supra note 13, ¶¶ 35–37.
19
FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 17.
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TBML continue to lack specificity, possibly contributing to a limited global
response to TBML threats to date by national and international authorities.20
This brief article therefore proposes original language for a 41st
Recommendation based in part on previous work by FATF and the
UNODC, as well as two previous articles by the authors hereof.21
II. WHY EXISTING U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES ARE
NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT
Previous articles have discussed why it is difficult for banks and
other financial institutions to effectively monitor and detect TBML,22 and
why a 41st Recommendation on TBML could effectively enhance
international cooperation on combating it.23 To effectively combat TBML,
all parties involved in international trade, including but not limited to
exporters, importers, financial firms other than banks (e.g., factors and other
non-bank financiers), and those involved in the transport of goods, defined
as “traders” in the FATF TBML Best Practices Paper,24 must implement
preventive measures against money laundering. Such measures would
include customer due diligence and enhanced due diligence, adequate
record-keeping, dedicated AML and combating the financing of terrorism
20

CLARE SULLIVAN & EVAN SMITH, AUSTL. GOV’T, AUSTL. INST. CRIMINOLOGY, TRADEBASED MONEY LAUNDERING: RISKS AND REGULATORY RESPONSES, at iii, 20 (2011), available
at http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/rpp/100-120/rpp115.aspx.
21
See infra Part III; Ross Delston & Stephen Walls, Reaching Beyond Banks: How to
Target Trade-Based Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Outside the Financial Sector, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 85, 92–98 (2009), reprinted in 2011 ANNUAL REVIEW OF
INTERNATIONAL BANKING LAW & PRACTICE (James E. Byrne & Christopher S. Byrnes eds.,
2011); see also Ross Delston, The 41st FATF Recommendation: Why Preventive Measures
Targeting Trade-Based Money Laundering Should Reach Beyond Banks, MONEY
LAUNDERING BULLETIN, March 2008, at 8 [hereinafter Delston, Preventive Measures]; Ross
Delston, The 41st FATF Recommendation: Why Banks Alone Cannot Prevent Trade-Based
Money Laundering, ACAMS TODAY, July–Aug. 2008, at 42 [hereinafter Delston, Banks].
22
See THE WOLFSBERG GROUP, THE WOLFSBERG TRADE FINANCE PRINCIPLES 1 (2009),
available at http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/pdf/WG_Trade_Finance_Principles_Final
_(Jan_09).pdf (noting that up to eighty percent of international trade takes place under socalled “Open Account” transactions between buyers and sellers, which generally provide a
bank with little or no information regarding the amount of the transaction, even omitting the
identities of those from whom and to whom the money is being transferred in many instances). See generally Delston, Preventive Measures, supra note 21; Delston, Banks, supra note
21.
23
See Delston & Walls, supra note 21.
24
FATF TBML BEST PRACTICES, supra note 12, at 2 (“The term trader refers to anyone
who facilitates the exchange of goods and related services across national borders, international boundaries or territories. This would also include a corporation or other business unit
organized and operated principally for the purpose of importing or exporting goods and
services (e.g. import/export companies).”).
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(CFT) compliance staff, and policies, procedures and internal controls,
training, as well as reporting suspicious transactions.
A.

Enhanced Inspections Are Critical but Impractical as a
Comprehensive Solution

A recent conviction in Ireland highlights why effective action on
TBML requires the participation of more entities than just financial
institutions.25 That case uncovered a customs fraud scheme in operation for
at least five years, which was discovered only when customs officers
searched a shipping container and found that the contents obviously did not
correspond to the description on the bill of lading. As a result, the head of
one of Ireland’s largest fruit and vegetable producers and distributers was
sentenced to six years in jail. A perhaps more alarming case is described in
the 2004 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, where
discrepancies discovered only after the physical inspection of goods from
Dubai unraveled a TBML scheme directly involving a member of
al-Qaeda.26
However, increasing on-site inspections of containers cannot be a
comprehensive response, given the cost, time delays, personnel and other
resources needed. Screening is enhanced by voluntary initiatives such as the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism and Container Security
(C-TPAT) Initiative run by Customs and Border Protection27 and statistics
monitoring teams such as the Trade Transparency Units (TTUs) run by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).28 However, these screening
enhancement efforts do not create a sufficient deterrent to laundering money
through the international trade system. Combating TBML, terrorist
financing, and thereby terrorism itself, is too crucial to our nation’s security
to entrust to foreign customs agents or rely on the limited deterrence created
by a voluntary program.

25

See Ireland Garlic Scam: Paul Begley Jailed for Six Years, BBC (Mar. 9, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17320460 (reporting on a recent importation
scam).
26
See 2004 INCSR, supra note 10, at 22 (detailing the discovery of a TBML scheme after
inspections of cosmetics and other goods being shipped through Dubai).
27
See C-TPAT: Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/ (last visited Apr. 22,
2012); CSI: Container Security Initiative, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, http://
www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
28
See Trade Transparency Unit, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/trade-transparency/ (last visited April 22, 2012); see also Homeland
Security Investigations Trade Transparency Unit, 7 CORNERSTONE REPORT, no. 3, 2011, at
3–4 (2011).
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Trade Transparency Units Are Valuable, but Currently Cannot
Generate Enough Information to Deter TBML

TTUs are excellent at detecting blatant documentary fraud and
monitoring other reporting discrepancies between two cooperating customs
authorities, but are not sufficient to detect documentary anomalies on all
sides of the transaction. A recent case involving a TBML scheme in
operation for at least ten years illustrates this difficulty.29 The Angel Toy
Company, based in Irvine, California, laundered Colombian and Mexican
drug money through purchases of toys manufactured in and exported from
China to third countries, presumably in Latin America.30 The company’s
reputation among international criminals for laundering drug money led
prosecutors to begin an investigation in 2008, and, in January 2012, two
company officers pleaded guilty to charges of structuring currency
transactions to avoid reporting requirements.31
In addition to difficulties with more complex trade transactions,
such as those involving a variety of entities in four or more countries, the
TTU statistics can be flawed due to fraudulent documentation by those
attempting to avoid export/import fees and taxes through simple customs
fraud. It would also be difficult to detect statistically the small number of
terrorists using international trade to transfer profits or illicit goods,
including arms and munitions, as well as weapons of mass destruction and
related precursor materials.
Despite plans announced by ICE in its Fiscal Year 2013
Congressional Budget Justification to nearly double the number of TTUs
with a slightly reduced overall budget,32 TTUs remain bilateral in nature,
and accordingly have limited scope, and must be implemented on a country-

29
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office Cent. Dist. Cal, Owners of Los Angeles Toy
Company Sentenced to Federal Prison for Role in International Scheme to Launder Money
for Drug Traffickers (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/usao/cac/Pressroom/2012/
021.html [hereinafter Owners of L.A. Toy Company Sentenced]
30
Dalina Castellanos, Toy Firm Owners get 3 Years in Money Laundering Case, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 31, 2012), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/01/toy-company-1.html;
see also ANGEL TOY, http://angeltoy.com/manufacturing.asp (last visited Apr. 22, 2012)
(explaining that “[o]nce the stuffed animals are produced, they are transported from our
factories to ports in Qingdao or Shanghai”).
31
Owners of L.A. Toy Company Sentenced, supra note 29; see also Castellanos, supra
note 30.
32
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
SALARIES AND EXPENSES: FISCAL YEAR 2013 CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION, 22 (2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-congressional-budget-justificationfy2013.pdf (stating that “in FY 2013, Domestic Investigations will . . . establish Trade
Transparency Units in the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia” to add to the six TTUs in
existence, with an overall budget reduction of $55.6 million).
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by-country basis, a costly and time-consuming process.33 New multilateral
customs initiatives, such as those being negotiated under the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), 34 could address the bilateral nature and quality of
reporting issues that currently exist for TTUs, but whether such a
multilateral effort will ever be effectively implemented remains to be seen.
III. THE LANGUAGE OF A 41ST RECOMMENDATION ON TBML
As discussed above, the acknowledged threat of TBML requires
international anti-money laundering action that reaches beyond banks. A
previous article by the authors outlined the necessary compliance programs,
customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting that could
contribute greatly to the international fight against TBML.35 To build on
those suggestions, a new 41st Recommendation is proposed here, using the
definition of “traders” found in the FATF TBML Best Practices Paper36 and
based on the approach taken in the existing FATF Recommendations:37
Recommendation 41, Trade-Based Money Laundering
Countries should have measures in place to monitor, detect and prosecute
abuses of the international trade system on the basis of the Vienna and Palermo Conventions, and should ensure that one or more competent domestic authorities are authorized to supervise traders. Countries should ensure
that effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions are available to these
authorities to deal with persons who fail to comply with AML/CFT requirements under this Recommendation, fail to declare or make false declarations on customs forms or on any documentation related to the import/export of such goods, including bills of lading, invoices, warehouse
receipts, and letters of credit. In cases where the goods or the underlying
import/export transaction are related to terrorist financing, money laundering or predicate offences, countries should also adopt measures, including
legislative measures consistent with Recommendation 4, that would enable
the confiscation of such goods.
Domestic authorities should be empowered to inspect shipments with
technology commensurate with the risks of money laundering and financing of terrorism, collect and review related documents, collect and analyze
33

SULLIVAN & SMITH, supra note 20, at 21.
Outlines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/outl
ines-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement (last visited Apr. 22, 2012) (“TPP countries also
have agreed on the importance of close cooperation between authorities to ensure the effective implementation and operation of the agreement as well as other customs matters.”).
35
See generally Delston & Walls, supra note 21.
36
FATF TBML BEST PRACTICES, supra note 12, at 2.
37
For example, Recommendation 32 on cash couriers, and Recommendations 22, 23 and
28 which apply to Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions, among others.
FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 17, at 19–21, 23–24, 25.
34
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information gathered by domestic law enforcement authorities, and monitor trade flows on a real-time basis. Commensurate with the risks identified, countries should implement new inspection technologies relating to
the prevention, suppression and disruption of proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.
Traders should be required to implement programmes against trade-based
money laundering and terrorist financing that encompass the following:
a) Adequate internal controls, including group-wide training and information-sharing, set out in Recommendation 18;
b) Customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements consistent
with Recommendations 10, 11, 12, 15 and 17 for import and export
transactions in an amount equal to or greater than the applicable designated threshold; and
c) Report suspicious transactions as set out in Recommendations 20 and
21.

An interpretive note to this 41st Recommendation could draw heavily from
red flags and other issues discussed in the 2006 FATF report entitled Trade
Based Money Laundering,38 the 2008 FATF Best Practices Paper on TradeBased Money Laundering,39 and the U.S. FFIEC BSA/AML Examination
Manual (2010),40 with other material from the interpretive notes for those
Recommendations cited in the text of the proposed Recommendation.
IV. CONCLUSION
As noted by the Australian Institute of Criminology in its report
entitled Trade-Based Money Laundering: Risks and Responses, a regime
along the lines proposed here would precipitate a significant expansion of
resources and oversight responsibilities for customs authorities.41 But we
should not be surprised if a problem this large fails to offer easy solutions,
nor should we be surprised that no jurisdiction is willing to be the first to
implement such a regime. Yet these two factors make an international
38

See FATF TBML REPORT, supra note 5 (discussing typologies, red-flag indicators, and
capacity building); see also Delston & Walls, supra note 21, at 103–16 (discussing red flags
and impact on TBML compliance programs).
39
See FATF TBML BEST PRACTICES, supra note 12 (discussing capacity building and
awareness raising, typologies and red-flag indicators, domestic mechanisms to link the work
of relevant authorities, data protection and privacy, international co-operation, and legitimate
trading activities).
40
See Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual, FED. FIN. INST.
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/manual_
online.htm (last visited May 5, 2012).
41
SULLIVAN & SMITH, supra note 20, at 23.
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cooperative body like FATF an ideal forum to implement an international
solution to a problem that is international in scope and requires a high
degree of mutual cooperation.
A 41st FATF Recommendation on TBML, including specific
guidance on customer due diligence and implementing the TBML
obligations identified by the UNODC,42 would allow the international
community to mobilize against abuse of the international trade system in a
manner beyond the capabilities of any single state or customs authority.
Given the size and scope of the problem, the difficulty in concluding a
binding, TBML-specific international convention, and the widespread
recognition of the risks entailed, the time is now for a 41st FATF
Recommendation on trade-based money laundering.

42

U.N. AML Report, supra note 13, ¶ 36 (identifying obligations such as identifying,
investigating, and prosecuting trade-based money-laundering offenses).

